ISLAMIC BANKING

Islamic Banking - by Mohamed Ariff, University of Malaya, taken from Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1988), pp. 46-62

Islamic banking is a new phenomenon that has taken many observers by surprise. The whole banking system has been islamized in both Iran and Pakistan. In addition, there are some thirty Islamic banks in operation in other parts of the globe, including the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) but excluding numerous non-bank Islamic financial institutions (see Appendix). What is more, the speed with which Islamic banks have sprung up and the rate at which they have progressed make it worth-while to study them systematically. An attempt is made in this paper (a) to survey the growing literature on Islamic banking, in particular (b) to trace the growth and development of Islamic banking, and (c) to highlight its salient characteristics.
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Evolution

The first modern experiment with Islamic banking was undertaken in Egypt under cover, without projecting an Islamic image, for fear of being seen as a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism which was anathema to the political regime. The pioneering effort, led by Ahmad El Najjar, took the form of a savings bank based on profit-sharing in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr in l963. This experiment lasted until l967 (Ready l98l), by which time there were nine such banks in the country. These banks, which neither charged nor paid interest, invested mostly by engaging in trade and industry, directly or in partnership with others, and shared the profits with their depositors (Siddiqi l988). Thus, they functioned essentially as saving- investment institutions rather than as commercial banks. The Nasir Social Bank, established in Egypt in l97l, was declared an interest-free commercial bank, although its charter made no reference to Islam or Shariah (Islamic law).

The IDB was established in l974 by the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), but it was primarily an inter-governmental bank aimed at providing funds for development projects in member countries. The IDB provides fee- based financial services and profit-sharing financial assistance to member countries. The IDB operations are free of interest and are explicitly based on

Shariah Principles

In the seventies, changes took place in the political climate of many Muslim countries so that there was no longer any strong need to establish Islamic financial institutions under cover. A number of Islamic banks, both in letter and spirit, came into existence in the Middle East, e.g., the Dubai Islamic Bank (l975), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (l977), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (l977), and the Bahrain Islamic Bank (l979), to mention a few. The Asia-Pacific region was not oblivious to the winds of change. The Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB) was established in l973 by Presidential Decree as a specialized banking institution without reference to its Islamic character in the bank's charter. The establishment of the PAB was a response by the Philippines Government to the Muslim rebellion in the south, designed to serve the special banking needs of the Muslim community. However, the primary task of the PAB was to assist rehabilitation and reconstruction in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in the south (Mastura l988). The PAB has eight branches located in the major cities of the southern Muslim provinces, including one in Makati (Metro Manila), in addition to the head office located at Zamboanga City in Mindanao. The PAB, however, is not strictly an Islamic bank, since interest-based operations continue to coexist with the Islamic modes of financing. It is indeed fascinating to observe that the PAB operates two 'windows' for deposit transactions, i.e., conventional and Islamic. Nevertheless, efforts are underway to convert the PAB into a full-fledged Islamic bank (Mastura l988).

Islamic banking made its debut in Malaysia in l983, but not without antecedents. The first Islamic financial institution in Malaysia was the Muslim Pilgrims Savings Corporation set up in l963 to help people save for performing hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina). In l969, this body evolved into the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board or the Tabung Haji as it is now popularly known. The Tabung Haji has been acting as a finance company that invests the savings of would-be pilgrims in accordance with Shariah, but its role is rather limited, as it is a non-bank financial institution. The success of the Tabung Haji, however, provided the main impetus for establishing Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) which represents a full- fledged Islamic commercial bank in Malaysia. The Tabung Haji also contributed l2.5 per cent of BIMB's initial capital of M$80 million. BIMB has a complement of fourteen branches in several parts of the country. Plans are afoot to open six new branches a year so that by l990 the branch network of BIMB will total thirty-three (Man l988).

Reference should also be made to some Islamic financial institutions established in countries where Muslims are a minority. There was a proliferation of interest-free savings and loan societies in India during the seventies (Siddiqi l988). The Islamic Banking System (now called Islamic Finance House), established in Luxembourg in l978, represents the first attempt at Islamic banking in the Western world. There is also an Islamic Bank International of Denmark, in Copenhagen, and the Islamic Investment Company has been set up in Melbourne, Australia.

Rationale

The essential feature of Islamic banking is that it is interest-free. Although it is often claimed that there is more to Islamic banking, such as contributions towards a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, and increased equity participation in the economy (Chapra l982), it nevertheless derives its specific rationale from the fact that there is no place for the institution of interest in the Islamic order.
Islam prohibits Muslims from taking or giving interest (riba) regardless of the purpose for which such loans are made and regardless of the rates at which interest is charged. To be sure, there have been attempts to distinguish between usury and interest and between loans for consumption and for production. It has also been argued that riba refers to usury practiced by petty money-lenders and not to interest charged by modern banks and that no riba is involved when interest is imposed on productive loans, but these arguments have not won acceptance. Apart from a few dissenting opinions, he general consensus among Muslim scholars clearly is that there is no difference between riba and interest. In what follows, these two terms are used interchangeably.

The prohibition of riba is mentioned in four different revelations in the Qur'an.1 The first revelation emphasizes that interest deprives wealth of God's blessings. The second revelation condemns it, placing interest in juxtaposition with wrongful appropriation of property belonging to others. The third revelation enjoins Muslims to stay clear of interest for the sake of their own welfare. The fourth revelation establishes a clear distinction between interest and trade, urging Muslims to take only the principal sum and to forgo even this sum if the borrower is unable to repay. It is further declared in the Qur'an that those who disregard the prohibition of interest are at war with God and His Prophet. The prohibition of interest is also cited in no uncertain terms in the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet). The Prophet condemned not only those who take interest but also those who give interest and those who record or witness the transaction, saying that they are all alike in guilt.2

It may be mentioned in passing that similar prohibitions are to be found in the pre-Qur'anic scriptures, although the 'People of the Book', as the Qur'an refers to them, had chosen to rationalize them. It is amazing that Islam has successfully warded off various subsequent rationalization attempts aimed at legitimizing the institution of interest.

Some scholars have put forward economic reasons to explain why interest is banned in Islam. It has been argued, for instance, that interest, being a pre- determined cost of production, tends to prevent full employment (Khan l968; Ahmad n.d.; Mannan l970). In the same vein, it has been contended that international monetary crises are largely due to the institution of interest (Khan, n.d), and that trade cycles are in no small measure attributable to the phenomenon of interest (Ahmad l952; Su'ud n.d.). None of these studies, however, has really succeeded in establishing a causal link between interest, on the one hand, and employment and trade cycles, on the other. Others, anxious to vindicate the Islamic position on interest, have argued that interest is not very effective as a monetary policy instrument even in capitalist economies and have questioned the efficacy of the rate of interest as a determinant of saving and investment (Ariff l982). A common thread running through all these discussions is the exploitative character of the institution of interest, although some have pointed out that profit (which is lawful in Islam) can also be exploitative. One response to this is that one must distinguish between profit and profiteering, and Islam has prohibited the latter as well.

Some writings have alluded to the 'unearned income' aspect of interest payments as a possible explanation for the Islamic doctrine. The objection that rent on property is considered halal (lawful) is then answered by rejecting the analogy between rent on property and interest on loans, since the benefit to the tenant is certain, while the productivity of the borrowed capital is uncertain. Besides, property rented out is subject to physical wear and tear, while money lent out is not. The question of erosion in the value of money and hence the need for indexation is an interesting one. But the Islamic jurists have ruled out compensation for erosion in the value of money, or, according to Hadith, a fungible good must be returned by its like (mithl): 'gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, equal for equal, and hand to hand ...'.3

The bottom line is that Muslims need no 'proofs' before they reject the institution of interest: no human explanation for a divine injunction is necessary for them to accept a dictum, as they recognize the limits to human reasoning. No human mind can fathom a divine order; therefore it is a matter of faith (iman).

The Islamic ban on interest does not mean that capital is costless in an Islamic system. Islam recognizes capital as a factor of production but it does not allow the factor to make a prior or pre-determined claim on the productive surplus in the form of interest. This obviously poses the question as to what will then replace the interest rate mechanism in an Islamic framework. There have been suggestions that profit-sharing can be a viable alternative (Kahf l982a and l982b). In Islam, the owner of capital can legitimately share the profits made by the entrepreneur. What makes profit- sharing permissible in Islam, while interest is not, is that in the case of the former it is only the profit-sharing ratio, not the rate of return itself that is predetermined.

It has been argued that profit-sharing can help allocate resources efficiently, as the profit-sharing ratio can be influenced by market forces so that capital will flow into those sectors which offer the highest profit- sharing ratio to the investor, other things being equal. One dissenting view is that the substitution of profit-sharing for interest as a resource allocating mechanism is crude and imperfect and that the institution of interest should therefore be retained as a necessary evil (Naqvi l982). However, mainstream Islamic thinking on this subject clearly points to the need to replace interest with something else, although there is no clear consensus on what form the alternative to the interest rate mechanism should take. The issue is not resolved and the search for an alternative continues, but it has not detracted from efforts to experiment with Islamic banking without interest.

Anatomy

As mentioned earlier, Islam does not deny that capital, as a factor of production, deserves to be rewarded. Islam allows the owners of capital a share in a surplus which is uncertain. To put it differently, investors in the Islamic order have no right to demand a fixed rate of return. No one is entitled to any addition to the principal sum if he does not share in the risks involved. The owner of capital (rabbul-mal) may 'invest' by allowing an entrepreneur with ideas and expertise to use the capital for productive purposes and he may share the profits, if any, with the entrepreneur- borrower (mudarib); losses, if any, however, will be borne wholly by the rabbul-mal. This mode of financing, termed mudaraba in the Islamic literature, was in practice even in the pre-Qur'anic days and, according to jurists, it was approved by the Prophet.

Another legitimate mode of financing recognized in Islam is one based on equity participation (musharaka) in which the partners use their capital jointly to generate a surplus. Profits or losses will be shared between the partners according to some agreed formula depending on the equity ratio. Mudaraba and musharaka constitute, at least in principle if not in practice, the twin pillars of Islamic banking. The musharaka principle is invoked in the equity structure of Islamic banks and is similar to the modern concepts of partnership and joint stock ownership. In so far as the depositors are concerned, an Islamic bank acts as a mudarib which manages the funds of the depositors to generate profits subject to the rules of mudaraba as outlined above. The bank may in turn use the depositors' funds on a mudaraba basis in addition to other lawful modes of financing. In other words, the bank operates a two-tier mudaraba system in which it acts both as the mudarib on the saving side of the equation and as the rabbul-mal on the investment portfolio side. The bank may also enter into musharaka contracts with the users of the funds, sharing profits and losses, as mentioned above. At the deposit end of the scale, Islamic banks normally operate three broad categories of account, mainly current, savings, and investment accounts. The current account, as in the case of conventional banks, gives no return to the depositors. It is essentially a safe-keeping (al-wadiah) arrangement between the depositors and the bank, which allows the depositors to withdraw their money at any time and permits the bank to use the depositors' money. As in the case of conventional banks, cheque books are issued to the current account deposit holders and the Islamic banks provide the broad range of payment facilities - clearing mechanisms, bank drafts, bills of exchange, travellers cheques, etc. (but not yet, it seems, credit cards or bank cards). More often than not, no service charges are made by the banks in this regard.

The savings account is also operated on an al-wadiah basis, but the bank may at its absolute discretion pay the depositors a positive return periodically, depending on its own profitability. Such payment is considered lawful in Islam since it is not a condition for lending by the depositors to the bank, nor is it pre-determined. The savings account holders are issued with savings books and are allowed to withdraw their money as and when they please. The investment account is based on the mudaraba principle, and the deposits are term deposits which cannot be withdrawn before maturity. The profit- sharing ratio varies from bank to bank and from time to time depending on supply and demand conditions.4 In theory, the rate of return could be positive or negative, but in practice the returns have always been positive and quite comparable to rates conventional banks offer on their term deposits.5

At the investment portfolio end of the scale, Islamic banks employ a variety of instruments. The mudaraba and musharaka modes, referred to earlier, are supposedly the main conduits for the outflow of funds from the banks. In practice, however, Islamic banks have shown a strong preference for other modes which are less risky. The most commonly used mode of financing seems to be the 'mark-up' device which is termed murabaha. In a murabaha transaction, the bank finances the purchase of a good or asset by buying it on behalf of its client and adding a mark-up before re-selling it to the client on a 'cost-plus' basis. It may appear at first glance that the mark-up is just another term for interest as charged by conventional banks, interest thus being admitted through the back door. What makes the murabaha transaction Islamically legitimate is that the bank first acquires the asset and in the process it assumes certain risks between purchase and resale. The bank takes responsibility for the good before it is safely delivered to the client. The services rendered by the Islamic bank are therefore regarded as quite different from those of a conventional bank which simply lends money to the client to buy the good.

Islamic banks have also been resorting to purchase and resale of properties on a deferred payment basis, which is termed bai' muajjal. It is considered lawful in fiqh (jurisprudence) to charge a higher price for a good if payments are to be made at a later date. According to fiqh, this does not amount to charging interest, since it is not a lending transaction but a trading one.

Leasing or ijara is also frequently practised by Islamic banks. Under this mode, the banks would buy the equipment or machinery and lease it out to their clients who may opt to buy the items eventually, in which case the monthly payments will consist of two components, i.e., rental for the use of the equipment and instalment towards the purchase price.

Reference must also be made to pre-paid purchase of goods, which is termed bai'salam, as a means used by Islamic banks to finance production. Here the price is paid at the time of the contract but the delivery would take place at a future date. This mode enables an entrepreneur to sell his output to the bank at a price determined in advance. Islamic banks, in keeping with modern times, have extended this facility to manufactures as well.

It is clear from the above sketch that Islamic banking goes beyond the pure financing activities of conventional banks. Islamic banks engage in equity financing and trade financing. By its very nature, Islamic banking is a risky business compared with conventional banking, for risk-sharing forms the very basis of all Islamic financial transactions. To minimize risks, however, Islamic banks have taken pains to distribute the eggs over many baskets and have established reserve funds out of past profits which they can fall back on in the event of any major loss.

Literature: Theory

It is not possible to cover in this survey all the publications which have appeared on Islamic banking. There are numerous publications in Arabic and Urdu which have made significant contributions to the theoretical discussion. A brief description of these in English can be found in the Appendix to Siddiqi's book on Banking without Interest (Siddiqi l983a). The early contributions on the subject of Islamic banking were somewhat casual in the sense that only passing references were made to it in the discussion of wider issues relating to the Islamic economic system as a whole. In other words, the early writers had been simply thinking aloud rather than presenting well-thought-out ideas. Thus, for example, the book by Qureshi on Islam and the Theory of Interest (Qureshi l946) looked upon banking as a social service that should be sponsored by the government like public health and education. Qureshi took this point of view since the bank could neither pay any interest to account holders nor charge any interest on loans advanced. Qureshi also spoke of partnerships between banks and businessmen as a possible alternative, sharing losses if any. No mention was made of profit-sharing.
Ahmad, in Chapter VII of his book Economics of Islam (Ahmad l952), envisaged the establishment of Islamic banks on the basis of a joint stock company with limited liability. In his scheme, in addition to current accounts, on which no dividend or interest should be paid, there was an account in which people could deposit their capital on the basis of partnership, with shareholders receiving higher dividends than the account holders from the profits made. Like Qureshi, above, Ahmad also spoke of possible partnership arrangements with the businessmen who seek capital from the banks. However, the partnership principle was left undefined, nor was it clear who would bear the loss if any. It was suggested that banks should cash bills of trade without charging interest, using the current account funds.

The principle of mudaraba based on Shariah was invoked systematically by Uzair (l955). His principal contribution lay in suggesting mudaraba as the main premise for 'interestless banking'. However, his argument that the bank should not make any capital investment with its own deposits rendered his analysis somewhat impractical.

Al-Arabi (l966) envisaged a banking system with mudaraba as the main pivot. He was actually advancing the idea of a two-tier mudaraba which would enable the bank to mobilize savings on a mudaraba basis, allocating the funds so mobilized also on a mudaraba basis. In other words the bank would act as a mudarib in so far as the depositors were concerned, while the 'borrowers' would act as mudaribs in so far as the bank was concerned. In his scheme, the bank could advance not only the capital procured through deposits but also the capital of its own shareholders. It is also of interest to note that his position with regard to the distribution of profits and the responsibility for losses was strictly in accordance with the Shariah.6 Irshad (l964) also spoke of mudaraba as the basis of Islamic banking, but his concept of mudaraba was quite different from the traditional one in that he thought of capital and labour (including entrepreneurship) as having equal shares in output, thus sharing the losses and profits equally. This actually means that the owner of capital and the entrepreneur have a fifty-fifty share in the profit or loss as the case may be, which runs counter to the Shariah position. Irshad envisaged two kinds of deposit accounts. The first sounded like current deposits in the sense that it would be payable on demand, but the money kept in this deposit would be used for social welfare projects, as the depositors would get zero return. The second one amounted to term deposits which would entitle the depositors to a share in the profits at the end of the year proportionately to the size and duration of the deposits. He recommended the setting up of a Reserve Fund which would absorb all losses so that no depositor would have to bear any loss. According to Irshad, all losses would be either recovered from the Reserve Fund or borne by the shareholders of the bank.

A pioneering attempt at providing a fairly detailed outline of Islamic banking was made in Urdu by Siddiqi in l968. (The English version was not published until l983.) His Islamic banking model was based on mudaraba and shirka (partnership or musharaka as it is now usually called). His model was essentially one based on a two-tier mudaraba financier-entrepreneur relationship, but he took pains to describe the mechanics of such transactions in considerable detail with numerous hypothetical and arithmetic examples. He classified the operations of an Islamic bank into three categories: services based on fees, commissions or other fixed charges; financing on the basis of mudaraba and partnership; and services provided free of charge. His thesis was that such interest-free banks could be a viable alternative to interest-based conventional banks.

The issue of loans for consumption clearly presents a problem, as there is no profit to be shared. Siddiqi addressed this problem, but he managed only to scratch the surface. While recognizing the need for such interest-free loans (qard hasan), especially for meeting basic needs, he seemed to think it was the duty of the community and the State (through its baitul mal or treasury) to cater to those needs; the Islamic bank's primary objective, like that of any other business unit, is to earn profit. He therefore tended to downplay the role of Islamic banks in providing consumption loans, but he suggested limited overdraft facilities without interest. He even considered a portion of the fund being set aside for consumption loans, repayment being guaranteed by the State. He also suggested that consumers buying durables on credit would issue 'certificates of sale' which could be encashed by the seller at the bank for a fee. It was then the seller not the buyer who would be liable as far as the bank was concerned. However, the principles of murabaha and bai' muajjal were not invoked.

Strangely, Siddiqi favoured keeping the number of shareholders to the minimum, without advancing any strong reasons. This is contrary to the general consensus which now seems to have emerged with reference to Islamic banks operating on a joint stock company basis, a consensus which incidentally is also in line with the Islamic value attached to a broad equity base as against heavy concentration of equity and wealth. Ironically, Siddiqi thought that interest-free banking could operate successfully 'only in a country where interest is legally prohibited and any transaction based upon interest is declared a punishable offense' (l983b:l3). He also thought it important to have Islamic laws enforced before interest-free banking could operate well. This view has not gained acceptance, as demonstrated by the many Islamic banks which operate profitably in 'hostile' environments, as noted earlier.

Chapra's model of Islamic banking (Chapra l982), like Siddiqi's, was based on the mudaraba principle. His main concern, however, centered on the role of artificial purchasing power through credit creation. He even suggested that 'seigniorage' resulting from it should be transferred to the public exchequer, for the sake of equity and justice. Al-Jarhi (l983) went so far as to favor the imposition of a l00 per cent reserve requirement on commercial banks. Chapra was also much concerned about the concentration of economic power private banks might enjoy in a system based on equity financing. He therefore preferred medium-sized banks which are neither so large as to wield excessive power nor so small as to be uneconomical. Chapra's scheme also contained proposals for loss-compensating reserves and loss-absorbing insurance facilities. He also spoke of non-bank financial institutions, which specialize in bringing financiers and entrepreneurs together and act as investment trusts.

Mohsin (l982) has presented a detailed and elaborate framework of Islamic banking in a modern setting. His model incorporates the characteristics of commercial, merchant, and development banks, blending them in novel fashion. It adds various non-banking services such as trust business, factoring, real estate, and consultancy, as though interest-free banks could not survive by banking business alone. Many of the activities listed certainly go beyond the realm of commercial banking and are of so sophisticated and specialized a nature that they may be thought irrelevant to most Muslim countries at their present stage of development. Mohsin's model clearly was designed to fit into a capitalist environment; indeed he explicitly stated that riba-free banks could coexist with interest-based banks. The point that there is more to Islamic banking than mere abolition of interest was driven home strongly by Chapra (l985). He envisaged Islamic banks whose nature, outlook and operations could be distinctly different from those of conventional banks. Besides the outlawing of riba, he considered it essential that Islamic banks should, since they handle public funds, serve the public interest rather than individual or group interests. In other words, they should play a social-welfare-oriented rather than a profit-maximizing role. He conceived of Islamic banks as a cross-breed of commercial and merchant banks, investment trusts and investment-management institutions that would offer a wide spectrum of services to their customers. Unlike conventional banks which depend heavily on the 'crutches of collateral and of non-participation in risk' (p. l55), Islamic banks would have to rely heavily on project evaluation, especially for equity-oriented financing. Thanks to the profit-and-loss sharing nature of the operations, bank-customer relations would be much closer and more cordial than is possible under conventional banking. Finally, the problems of liquidity shortage or surplus would have to be handled differently in Islamic banking, since the ban on interest rules out resort to the money market and the central bank. Chapra suggested alternatives such as reciprocal accommodation among banks without interest payments and creation of a common fund at the central bank into which surpluses would flow and from which shortages could be met without any interest charges.

The literature also discusses the question of central banking in an Islamic framework. The general opinion seems to be that the basic functions of a modern central bank are relevant also for an Islamic monetary system, although the mechanisms may have to be different. Thus, for example, the bank rate instrument cannot be used as it entails interest. Uzair (l982) has suggested adjustments in profit-sharing ratios as a substitute for bank rate manipulations by the central bank. Thus, credit can be tightened by reducing the share accruing to the businessmen and eased by increasing it. Siddiqi (l982) has suggested that variations in the so-called 'refinance ratio' (which refers to the central bank refinancing of a part of the interest-free loans provided by the commercial banks) would influence the quantum of short-term credit extended. Siddiqi has also proposed a prescribed 'lending ratio' (i.e., the proportion of demand deposits that commercial banks are obliged to lend out as interest-free loans) that can be adjusted by the central bank according to changing circumstances. In this context, reference may also be made to a proposal by Uzair (l982) that the central bank should acquire an equity stake in commercial banking by holding, say, 25 per cent of the capital stock of the commercial banks. The rationale behind this proposal was that it would give the central bank access to a permanent source of income so that it could effectively act as lender of last resort. The discussion of central banking in an Islamic context is somewhat scanty, presumably because Islamic central banking is viewed as too far-fetched an idea, except in Iran and Pakistan.

It emerges from all this that Islamic banking has three distinguishing features: (a) it is interest-free, (b) it is multi-purpose and not purely commercial, and (c) it is strongly equity-oriented. The literature contains hardly any serious criticism of the interest-free character of the operation, since this is taken for granted, although concerns have been expressed about the lack of adequate interest-free instruments. There is a near-consensus that Islamic banks can function well without interest. A recent International Monetary Fund study by Iqbal and Mirakhor (l987) has found Islamic banking to be a viable proposition that can result in efficient resource allocation. The study suggests that banks in an Islamic system face fewer solvency and liquidity risks than their conventional counterparts. The multi-purpose and extra-commercial nature of the Islamic banking operation does not seem to pose intractable problems. The abolition of interest makes it imperative for Islamic banks to look for other instruments, which renders operations outside the periphery of commercial banking unavoidable. Such operations may yield economies of scope. But it is undeniable that the multipurpose character of Islamic banking poses serious practical problems, especially in relation to the skills needed to handle such diverse and complex transactions (Iqbal and Mirakhor l987).

The stress on equity-oriented transactions in Islamic banking, especially the mudaraba mode, has been criticized. It has been argued that the replacement of pre-determined interest by uncertain profits is not enough to render a transaction Islamic, since profit can be just as exploitative as interest is, if it is 'excessive' (Naqvi l98l). Naqvi has also pointed out that there is nothing sacrosanct about the institution of mudaraba in Islam. Naqvi maintains that mudaraba is not based on the Qur'an or the Hadith but was a custom of the pre-Islamic Arabs. Historically, mudaraba, he contends, enabled the aged, women, and children with capital to engage in trade through merchants for a share in the profit, all losses being borne by the owners of capital, and therefore it cannot claim any sanctity. The fact remains that the Prophet raised no objection to mudaraba, so that it was at least not considered un-Islamic.

The distribution of profit in mudaraba transactions presents practical difficulties, especially where there are multiple providers of capital, but these difficulties are not regarded as insurmountable. The Report of Pakistan's Council of Islamic Ideology (CII l983) has suggested that the respective capital contributions of parties can be converted to a common denominator by multiplying the amounts provided with the number of days during which each component, such as the firm's own equity capital, its current cash surplus and suppliers' credit was actually deployed in the business, i.e., on a daily product basis. As for deposits, profits (net of administrative expenses, taxes, and appropriation for reserves) would be divided between the shareholders of the bank and the holders of deposits, again on a daily product basis.

Literature: Practice
Recent years have brought an increasing flow of empirical studies of Islamic banking. The earliest systematic empirical work was undertaken by Khan (l983). His observations covered Islamic banks operating in Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Khan's study showed that these banks had little difficulty in devising practices in conformity with Shariah. He identified two types of investment accounts: one where the depositor authorized the banks to invest the money in any project and the other where the depositor had a say in the choice of project to be financed. On the asset side, the banks under investigation had been resorting to mudaraba, musharaka and murabaha modes. Khan's study reported profit rates ranging from 9 to 20 per cent which were competitive with conventional banks in the corresponding areas. The rates of return to depositors varied between 8 and l5 per cent, which were quite comparable with the rates of return offered by conventional banks.
Khan's study revealed that Islamic banks had a preference for trade finance and real estate investments. The study also revealed a strong preference for quick returns, which is understandable in view of the fact that these newly established institutions were anxious to report positive results even in the early years of operation. Nienhaus (1988) suggests that the relative profitability of Islamic banks, especially in the Middle East in recent years, was to a large extent due to the property (real estate) boom. He has cited cases of heavy losses which came with the crash of the property sector.

The IMF study referred to earlier by Iqbal and Mirakhor (l987) also contains extremely interesting empirical observations, although these are confined to the experience of Iran and Pakistan, both of which have attempted to islamize the entire banking system on a comprehensive basis. Iran switched to Islamic banking in August l983 with a three-year transition period. The Iranian system allows banks to accept current and savings deposits without having to pay any return, but it permits the banks to offer incentives such as variable prizes or bonuses in cash or kind on these deposits. Term deposits (both short-term and long-term) earn a rate of return based on the bank's profits and on the deposit maturity. No empirical evidence is as yet available on the interesting question as to whether interest or a profit-share provides the more effective incentive to depositors for the mobilization of private saving. Where Islamic and conventional banks exist side by side, central bank control of bank interest rates is liable to be circumvented by shifts of funds to the Islamic banks.

Iqbal and Mirakhor have noted that the conversion to Islamic modes has been much slower on the asset than on the deposit side. It appears that the Islamic banking system in Iran was able to use less than half of its resources for credit to the private sector, mostly in the form of short-term facilities, i.e., commercial and trade transactions. The slower pace of conversion on the asset side was attributed by the authors to the inadequate supply of personnel trained in long-term financing. The authors, however, found no evidence to show that the effectiveness of monetary policy in Iran, broadly speaking, was altered by the conversion.

The Pakistani experience differs from the Iranian one in that Pakistan had opted for a gradual islamization process which began in l979. In the first phase, which ended on l January l985, domestic banks operated both interest- free and interest-based 'windows'. In the second phase of the transformation process, the banking system was geared to operate all transactions on the basis of no interest, the only exceptions being foreign currency deposits, foreign loans and government debts. The Pakistani model took care to ensure that the new modes of financing did not upset the basic functioning and structure of the banking system. This and the gradual pace of transition, according to the authors, made it easier for the Pakistani banks to adapt to the new system. The rate of return on profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) deposits appears not only to have been in general higher than the interest rate before islamization but also to have varied between banks, the differential indicating the degree of competition in the banking industry. The authors noted that the PLS system and the new modes of financing had accorded considerable flexibility to banks and their clients. Once again the study concluded that the effectiveness of monetary policy in Pakistan was not impaired by the changeover.

The IMF study, however, expressed considerable uneasiness about the concentration of bank assets on short-term trade credits rather than on long-term financing. This the authors found undesirable, not only because it is inconsistent with the intentions of the new system, but also because the heavy concentration on a few assets might increase risks and destabilize the asset portfolios. The study also drew attention to the difficulty experienced in both Iran and Pakistan in financing budget deficits under a non-interest system and underscored the urgent need to devise suitable interest-free instruments. Iran has, however, decreed that government borrowing on the basis of a fixed rate of return from the nationalized banking system would not amount to interest and would hence be permissible. The official rationalization is that, since all banks are nationalized, interest rates and payments among banks will cancel out in the consolidated accounts. (This, of course, abstracts from the banks' business with non-bank customers.) There are also some small case studies of Islamic banks operating in Bangladesh (Huq l986), Egypt (Mohammad l986), Malaysia (Halim l988b), Pakistan (Khan l986), and Sudan (Salama l988b). These studies reveal interesting similarities and differences. The current accounts in all cases are operated on the principles of al-wadiah. Savings deposits, too, are accepted on the basis of al-wadiah, but 'gifts' to depositors are given entirely at the discretion of the Islamic banks on the minimum balance, so that the depositors also share in profits. Investment deposits are invariably based on the mudaraba principle, but there are considerable variations. Thus, for example, the Islamic Bank of Bangladesh has been offering PLS Deposit Accounts, PLS Special Notice Deposit Accounts, and PLS Term Deposit Accounts, while Bank Islam Malaysia has been operating two kinds of investment deposits, one for the general public and the other for institutional clients.

The studies also show that the profit-sharing ratios and the modes of payment vary from place to place and from time to time. Thus, for example, profits are provisionally declared on a monthly basis in Malaysia, on a quarterly basis in Egypt, on a half-yearly basis in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and on an annual basis in Sudan.

A striking common feature of all these banks is that even their investment deposits are mostly short-term, reflecting the depositors' preference for assets in as liquid a form as possible. Even in Malaysia, where investment deposits have accounted for a much larger proportion of the total, the bulk of them were made for a period of less than two years. By contrast, in Sudan most of the deposits have consisted of current and savings deposits, apparently because of the ceiling imposed by the Sudanese monetary authorities on investment deposits which in turn was influenced by limited investment opportunities in the domestic economy. There are also interesting variations in the pattern of resource utilization by the Islamic banks. For example, musharaka has been far more important than murabaha as an investment mode in Sudan, while the reverse has been the case in Malaysia. On the average, however, murabaha, bai'muajjal and ijara, rather than musharaka represent the most commonly used modes of financing. The case studies also show that the structure of the clientele has been skewed in favor of the more affluent segment of society, no doubt because the banks are located mainly in metropolitan centres with small branch networks.

The two main problems identified by the case studies are the absence of suitable non-interest-based financial instruments for money and capital market transactions and the high rate of borrower delinquency. The former problem has been partially redressed by Islamic banks resorting to mutual inter-bank arrangements and central bank cooperation, as mentioned earlier. The Bank Islam Malaysia, for instance, has been placing its excess liquidity with the central bank which usually exercises its discretionary powers to give some returns. The delinquency problem appears to be real and serious. Murabaha payments have often been held up because late payments cannot be penalized, in contrast to the interest system in which delayed payments would automatically mean increased interest payments. To overcome this problem, the Pakistani banks have resorted to what is called 'mark-down' which is the opposite of 'mark-up' (i.e., the profit margin in the cost-plus approach of murabaha transactions). 'Mark-down' amounts to giving rebates as an incentive for early payments. But the legitimacy of this 'mark-down' practice is questionable on Shariah grounds, since it is time- based and therefore smacks of interest.

In the Southeast Asian context, two recent studies on the Bank Islam Malaysia by Man (l988) and the Philippine Amanah Bank by Mastura (l988) deserve special mention. The Malaysian experience in Islamic banking has been encouraging. Man's study shows that the average return to depositors has been quite competitive with that offered by conventional banks. By the end of l986, after three years of operation, the bank had a network of fourteen branches. However, 90 per cent of its deposits had maturities of two years or less, and non-Muslim depositors accounted for only 2 per cent of the total. Man is particularly critical of the fact that the mudaraba and musharaka modes of operation, which are considered most meaningful by Islamic scholars, accounted for a very small proportion of the total investment portfolio, while bai'muajjal and ijara formed the bulk of the total. It is evident from Mastura's analysis that the Philippine Amanah Bank is, strictly speaking, not an Islamic bank, as interest-based operations continue to coexist with Islamic modes of financing. Thus, the PAB has been operating both interest and Islamic 'windows' for deposits. Mastura's study has produced evidence to show that the PAB has been concentrating on murabaha transactions, paying hardly any attention to the mudaraba and musharaka means of financing. The PAB has also been adopting unorthodox approaches in dealing with excess liquidity by making use of interest- bearing treasury bills. Nonetheless, the PAB has also been invoking some Islamic modes in several major investment activities. Mastura has made special references to the qirad principle adopted by the PAB in the Kilu-sang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) movement launched under Marcos and to the ijara financing for the acquisition of farm implements and supplies in the Quedon food production program undertaken by the present regime. So far no reference has been made to Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, with Muslims accounting for 90 per cent of a population of some 165 million. The explanation is that a substantial proportion, especially in Java, are arguably nominal Muslims. Indonesians by and large subscribe to the Pancasila ideology which is essentially secular in character. The present regime seems to associate Islamic banking with Islamic fundamentalism to which the regime is not at all sympathetic. Besides, the intellectual tradition in Indonesia in modern times has not been conducive to the idea of interest-free banking. There were several well respected Indonesian intellectuals including Hatta (the former Vice President) who had argued that riba prohibited in Islam was not the same as interest charged or offered by modern commercial banks, although Islamic jurists in Indonesia hold the opposite view. The Muslim public seems somewhat indifferent to all this. This, however, does not mean that there are no interest-free financial institutions operating in Indonesia. One form of traditional interest-free borrowing is the still widely prevalent form of informal rural credit known as ijon (green) because the loan is secured on the standing crop as described by Partadireja (1974). Another is the arisan system practiced among consumers and small craftsmen and traders. In this system, each member contributes regularly a certain sum and obtains interest-free loans from the pool by drawing lots. The chances of an Islamic bank being established in Indonesia seem at present remote (cf. Rahardjo 1988).

Finally, in the most recent contribution to the growing Islamic banking literature, Nien-haus (l988) concludes that Islamic banking is viable at the microeconomic level but dismisses the proponents' ideological claims for superiority of Islamic banking as 'unfounded'. Nienhaus points out that there are some failure stories. Examples cited include the Kuwait Finance House which had its fingers burned by investing heavily in the Kuwaiti real estate and construction sector in l984, and the Islamic Bank International of Denmark which suffered heavy losses in l985 and l986 to the tune of more than 30 per cent of its paid-up capital. But then, as Nienhaus himself has noted, the quoted troubles of individual banks had specific causes and it would be inappropriate to draw general conclusions from particular cases. Nienhaus notes that the high growth rates of the initial years have been falling off, but he rejects the thesis that the Islamic banks have reached their 'limits of growth' after filling a market gap. The falling growth rates might well be due to the bigger base values, and the growth performance of Islamic banks has been relatively better in most cases than that of conventional banks in recent years.

According to Nienhaus, the market shares of many Islamic banks have increased over time, notwithstanding the deceleration in the growth of deposits. The only exception was the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) whose market share had shrunk from l5 per cent in l982 to 7 per cent in l986, but Nien-haus claims that the market shares lost by FIBS were won not by conventional banks but by newer Islamic banks in Sudan. Short-term trade financing has clearly been dominant in most Islamic banks regardless of size. This is contrary to the expectation that the Islamic banks would be active mainly in the field of corporate financing on a participation basis. Nien-haus attributes this not only to insufficient supply by the banks but also to weak demand by entrepreneurs who may prefer fixed interest cost to sharing their profits with the banks.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion makes it clear that Islamic banking is not a negligible or merely temporary phenomenon. Islamic banks are here to stay and there are signs that they will continue to grow and expand. Even if one does not subscribe to the Islamic injunction against the institution of interest, one may find in Islamic banking some innovative ideas which could add more variety to the existing financial network.
One of the main selling points of Islamic banking, at least in theory, is that, unlike conventional banking, it is concerned about the viability of the project and the profitability of the operation but not the size of the collateral. Good projects which might be turned down by conventional banks for lack of collateral would be financed by Islamic banks on a profit-sharing basis. It is especially in this sense that Islamic banks can play a catalytic role in stimulating economic development. In many developing countries, of course, development banks are supposed to perform this function. Islamic banks are expected to be more enterprising than their conventional counterparts. In practice, however, Islamic banks have been concentrating on short-term trade finance which is the least risky.

Part of the explanation is that long-term financing requires expertise which is not always available. Another reason is that there are no back-up institutional structures such as secondary capital markets for Islamic financial instruments. It is possible also that the tendency to concentrate on short-term financing reflects the early years of operation: it is easier to administer, less risky, and the returns are quicker. The banks may learn to pay more attention to equity financing as they grow older.

It is sometimes suggested that Islamic banks are rather complacent. They tend to behave as though they had a captive market in the Muslim masses who will come to them on religious grounds. This complacency seems more pronounced in countries with only one Islamic bank. Many Muslims find it more convenient to deal with conventional banks and have no qualms about shifting their deposits between Islamic banks and conventional ones depending on which bank offers a better return. This might suggest a case for more Islamic banks in those countries as it would force the banks to be more innovative and competitive. Another solution would be to allow the conventional banks to undertake equity financing and/or to operate Islamic 'counters' or 'windows', subject to strict compliance with the Shariah rules. It is perhaps not too wild a proposition to suggest that there is a need for specialized Islamic financial institutions such as mudaraba banks, murabaha banks and musharaka banks which would compete with one another to provide the best possible services.

Glossary

al-wadiah = safe keeping
bai'muajjal = deferred-payment sale
bai'salam = pre-paid purchase
baitul mal = treasury
fiqh = jurisprudence
Hadith = Prophet's commentary on Qur'an
hajj = pilgrimage
halal = lawful
haram = unlawful
ijara = leasing
iman = faith
mithl = like
mudaraba = profit-sharing
mudarib = entrepreneur-borrower
muqarada = mudaraba
murabaha = cost-plus or mark-up
musharaka = equity participation
qard hasan = benevolent loan (interest free)
qirad = mudaraba
rabbul-mal = owner of capital
riba = interest
Shariah = Islamic law
shirka = musharaka

Appendix

Islamic Financial Institutions (outside Pakistan and Iran)
Australia Islamic Investment Company, Melbourne.
Bahamas Dar al Mal al Islami, Nassau Islamic Investment Company Ltd, Nassau, Masraf Faisal Islamic Bank & Trust, Bahamas Ltd.
Bahrain Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank, Manama, Bahrain Islamic Bank, Manama, Bahrain Islamic Investment Company, Manama, Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf, Masraf Faisal al Islami, Bahrain.
Bangladesh Islamic Bank of Bangladesh Ltd, Dhaka.
Denmark Islamic Bank International of Denmark, Copenhagen.
Egypt Albaraka Nile Valley Company, Cairo, Arab Investment Bank (Islamic Banking Operations), Cairo., Bank Misr (Islamic Branches), Cairo, Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, Cairo, General Investment Company, Cairo, Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development, Cairo, Islamic Investment and Development Company, Cairo, Nasir Social Bank, Cairo.
Guinea Islamic Investment Company of Guinea, Conakry, Masraf Faisal al Islami of Guinea, Conakry.
India Baitun Nasr Urban Cooperative Society, Bombay.
Jordan Islamic Investment House Company Ltd Amman, Jordan Finance House, Amman, Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment, Amman.
Kibris (Turkish Cyprus) Faisal Islamic Bank of Kibris, Lefkosa.
Kuwait Al Tukhaim International Exchange Company, Safat., Kuwait Finance House, Safat.
Liberia African Arabian Islamic Bank, Monrovia.
Liechtenstein Arinco Arab Investment Company, Vaduz, Islamic Banking System Finance S.A. Vaduz.
Luxembourg Islamic Finance House Universal Holding S.A.
Malaysia Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, Pilgrims Management and Fund Board, Kuala Lumpur.
Mauritania Albaraka Islamic Bank, Mauritania.
Niger Faisal Islamic Bank of Niger, Niamy.
Philippines Philippine Amanah Bank, Zamboanga.
Qatar Islamic Exchange and Investment Company, Doha, Qatar Islamic Bank.
Saudi Arabia Albaraka Investment and Development Company, Jeddah, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah.
Senegal Faisal Islamic Bank of Senegal, Dakar, Islamic Investment Company of Senegal, Dakar.
South Africa JAAME Ltd, Durban.
Sudan Bank al Baraka al Sudani, Khartoum, Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, Khartoum, Islamic Bank of Western Sudan, Khartoum, Islamic Cooperative Development Bank, Khartoum, Islamic Investment Company of Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan Islamic Bank, Khartoum, Tadamun Islamic Bank, Khartoum, Jersey The Islamic Investment Company, St Helier, Masraf Faisal al Islami, St Helier.
Switzerland Dar al Mal al Islami, Geneva., Islamic Investment Company Ltd, Geneva, Shariah Investment Services, PIG, Geneva.
Thailand Arabian Thai Investment Company Ltd, Bangkok.
Tunisia Bank al Tamwil al Saudi al Tunisi.
Turkey Albaraka Turkish Finance House, Istanbul, Faisal Finance Institution, Istanbul.
U.A.E. Dubai Islamic Bank, Dubai, Islamic Investment Company Ltd, Sharjah.
U.K. Albaraka International Ltd, London, Albaraka Investment Co. Ltd, London, Al Rajhi Company for Islamic Investment Ltd, London, Islamic Finance House Public Ltd Co., London.

The list includes Islamic banks as well as Islamic investment companies but it does not include Islamic insurance or takaful companies.

Source: Siddiqi (l988)

References

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1 Surah al-Rum (Chapter 30), verse 39; Surah al-Nisa (Chapter 39), verse l6l; Surah al-Imran (Chapter 3), verses l30-2; Surah al-Baqarah (Chapter 2), verses 275-8l. See Yusuf Ali's Translation of the Qur'an.

2 Hadith compiled by Muslims (Kitab al-Musaqat).

3 This refers to a Hadith compiled by Muslims (Kitab al-Musaqat).

4 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad has been offering a 70:30 profit-sharing ratio in favour of depositors (Man l988).

5 In l984 the Islamic Bank of Bangladesh offered rates of return ranging from 4.95 per cent to l4.l3 per cent. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, Cairo, gave a 9 per cent rate of return on deposits in the same year (Afkar Inquiry, December l985).

6 According to Sharia, profits arising from a mudaraba arrangement can be divided in any proportion between the two contracting parties as agreed upon at the tim

SYEIKH ABDULLAH AL-QUMAIRI

Syeikh Abdullah Al-Qumairi ulama dan pencipta nama Kedah Darul Aman
Oleh (Allahyarham) Wan Mohd. Shaghir Abdullah (Al-Fatihah)

ADA yang berpendapat bahawa tokoh penyebar Islam di Aceh yang juga penyusun kitab Bahr Al-Lahut iaitu Syeikh Abdullah Arif adalah sahabat kepada tokoh ulama yang diperkenalkan pada kali ini.

Namun ada pula berpendapat bahawa kedua-dua Syeikh Abdullah ini adalah orang yang sama.

Syeikh Abdullah Arif di Aceh dikatakan berada di Aceh sekitar tahun 560H/1165M-1177M, sedangkan Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi ini atau nama lengkapnya Tuan Syeikh Abdullah bin Tuan Syeikh Ahmad bin Tuan Syeikh Ja’far Qumairi berasal dari Syahir Yemen dan tiba di Kedah tahun 531 H.

Kisah lengkap Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi yang lengkap diriwayatkan oleh Muhammad Hassan bin Muhammad Arsyad dalam al-Tarikh Salasilah Negeri Kedah. Ia ditransliterasi dari tulisan Melayu/Jawi kepada Latin/Rumi dan diterbitkan oleh Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka tahun 1968.

Menurut Buyong Adil dalam Sejarah Kedah (Terbitan DBP, 1980), kedatangan Syeikh Abdullah ke Kedah tahun 531H itu bersamaan dengan tahun 1136M. Menurut Bahayuddin Haji Yahaya dalam Naskhah Jawi, tahun 531H itu bersamaan dengan tahun 1137M.

Diriwayatkan bahawa Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi adalah seorang ulama yang berasal dari Yaman dan datang bersama-sama dengan 11 orang sahabatnya.

Dalam buku Sejarah Kedah Sepintas Lalu (Diterbitkan oleh Jawatankuasa Penerbitan Universiti Utara Malaysia, cetakan pertama 1987 hlm 10) oleh Haji Ibrahim Ismail, disebutkan dalam Hikayat Merong Maha Wangsa bahawa Syeikh Abdullah al-Yamani (berkemungkinan maksudnya Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi al-Yamani) adalah murid kepada Syeikh Abdullah di Baghdad.

Jika disemak dengan teliti kandungan buku tersebut, penulis menyimpulkan Islam datang ke Kedah jauh lebih awal daripada kedatangan Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi.

Ini kerana dinyatakan dalam buku tersebut bahawa sesudah merdeka ditemui sebuah nisan di Langgar, Kedah yang berinskripsikan nama Syeikh Abdul Qadir ibnu Husein Syah Alirah/Alam dan tarikhnya 291H bersamaan 903M. Haji Ibrahim Ismail memetik dari kertas kerja berjudul ‘Sejarah Kedah Dalam Kebangkitan Islam’ (1982) oleh Ismail bin Haji Salleh.

Selain itu, ia juga disebut oleh Abdullah Abbas Nasution dalam Islam 14 Abad dan manuskripnya diserahkan kepada penulis. Lihat juga Pengiran Haji Muhammad bin Pengiran Haji Abd. Rahman dalam Islam di Brunei Darussalam, cetakan Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Brunei, cetakan pertama, 1992, halaman 30.

Mendahului

Melihat kepada perbandingan tahun kedatangan di antara kedua-dua tokoh ini iaitu Syeikh Abdullah Arif di Aceh (560H/1165M) dengan Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi berserta 11 orang sahabatnya di Kedah, ini bermakna Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi di Kedah mendahului kedatangan Syeikh Abdullah Arif di Aceh lebih kurang 29 tahun.

Namun apabila dibandingkan pula dengan tarikh batu nisan Syeikh Abdul Qadir ibnu Husein Syah Alirah di Langgar, Kedah pada tahun 291H/903M dengan tulisan M. Junus Djamil yang menyebut bahawa kerajaan Islam telah lahir di Perlak tahun 225H/840M, yang dilihat perbezaannya adalah lebih kurang 66 tahun.

Oleh itu, apabila dilihat tahun-tahun tersebut perbezaannya tidak jauh. Walaupun dinyatakan oleh Haji Ibrahim Ismail bahawa kerajaan itu lebih kurang 300 tahun lebih awal dari kewujudan Kedah (Lihat Sejarah Kedah Sepintas Lalu, halaman 18).

Menurut buku Al-Tarikh Salasilah Negeri Kedah dan dipetik oleh Buyong Adil bahawa Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi dan 11 orang sahabatnya telah berhasil mengislamkan Raja Kedah yang kesembilan, iaitu Maharaja Derbar/Durbar Raja II yang ketika itu berkedudukan di Istana Bukit Meriam.

Namun, dalam Hikayat Merong Maha Wangsa, bukan raja yang kesembilan, tetapi adalah raja yang ketujuh. Nama raja juga berbeza, raja Kedah menurut hikayat tersebut bernama Phra Ong Maha Wangsa.

Nama baginda raja itu juga ditukar oleh Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi dari Maharaja Derbar/Durbar Raja II @ Phra Ong Maha Wangsa menjadi Sultan Muzaffar Syah I(mangkat pada 13 safar 575 Hijrah / 1179 M). Negeri Kedah pula diberi nama Kedah Darul Aman.

Pada hari pengislaman raja Kedah itu turut diislamkan pembesar-pembesar istana. Ini bererti dilakukan pengislaman secara massal.

Pengislaman terhadap rakyat pula diatur strategi bersama-sama di antara Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi berserta 11 orang sahabatnya, bahkan disertai Sultan Muzaffar Syah I sendiri. Dalam waktu yang singkat dan cepat, hasil kerjasama yang padu dan sepakat antara ulama (Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi) dengan umara (Sultan Muzaffar Syah I) tersebut, maka rakyat Melayu yang asal dalam kerajaan Kedah Darul Aman serta merta memeluk Islam kesemuanya.

Ini membuktikan kejayaan dakwah dan pendidikan Islam yang dijalankan oleh Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi yang benar-benar ikhlas dan bertanggungjawab.

Oleh itu, secara langsung Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi adalah sebagai guru kepada Sultan Muzaffar Syah I, malah guru bagi pihak keluarga istana Sultan Kedah Darul Aman. Oleh kerana sangat kasih dan hormat Sultan Muzaffar Syah I kepada Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi, baginda melantik ulama tersebut sebagai orang tua dan penasihatnya.

Untuk mengembangkan lagi dakwahnya, Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi menyarankan supaya dibina sebuah menara sebagai tanda kebesaran Islam di puncak Gunung Jerai. Menara tersebut dijadikan sebagai tempat azan, untuk menyeru orang sembahyang. Maka, Sultan Muzaffar Syah I memerintahkan supaya dilaksanakan saranan ulama tersebut.


Wasiat

Setelah binaan menara tersebut hampir siap, Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi jatuh sakit dan ditakdirkan meninggal dunia beberapa hari selepas itu. Sebelum wafat, beliau sempat meninggalkan wasiat agar jenazahnya dikebumikan di tanah yang rata berdekatan dengan menara yang hampir siap itu. Sekitar kubur beliau itu dinamakan orang dengan Padang Tok Syeikh.

Tuan Guru Haji Mahmud Nasri bin Utsman (tokoh yang menghidupkan Silat Abjad), pernah bercerita kepada murid-muridnya bahawa seorang wali Allah yang sangat terkenal iaitu Syeikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani pernah menziarahi kubur Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi beberapa kali. Beliau juga pernah sembahyang di tempat tanah lapang di Gunung Jerai itu.

Kisah mengenai Syeikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani pernah menziarahi kubur Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi itu dapat diterima akal kerana wali Allah tersebut wafat dalam tahun 561H/166M sedangkan Syeikh Abdullah al-Qumairi wafat dalam sekitar tidak berapa lama setelah kedatangannya di Kedah itu (531H/1136M atau 1137M).

Mengenai Syeikh Abdullah Al-Qumairi

* Datang ke Kedah pada tahun 1136 atau 1137.

* Berasal dari Yemen.

* Mengislamkan maharaja Derbar/Durbar II di Istana Bukit Meriam.

* Menukar nama Raja kepada Sultan Muzaffar Shah I.

* Guru Sultan Muzaffar Syah I.

* Memberi nama Kedah Darul Aman.

* Mengarahkan dibina menara kebesaran Islam untuk azan di Gunung Jerai.

Lebih banyak koleksi artikel Allahyarham boleh ditemui di laman web PGSSAJKM - http://geocities.com/pgssajkm/home.html

ISLAM IS SIMPLE AND EASY

Note : the reason of publishing this article here is neither to object the actual practice nor serves as verification or support to the following article or any of its contents

BY : Dr. Wan Azhar Wan Ahmad
Senior Fellow/Director of Syariah Centre, Laws and Political Science
Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM Malaysia)

20/11/2007 as reported in The Star

Islam is not difficult. When I was teaching at the Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), most of my students-if not all-were amazed when I remarked that Muslims are not to pray when traveling long distances on airplanes; that Muslim surgeons may choose to combine (jama') their prayers if they are working long hours in operation theatres; and that Muslims from all walks of life may also choose to combine their prayers for reasons other than those mentioned by the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w).

Now we have successfully launched our first Malaysian, a Muslim, to outer space. Proud of the achievement, I was and still am amazed to learn that this Muslim traveller was made to assume that prayers throughout his 10-day stay hundred kilometers above earth was obligatory! What was even more amazing was a special manual for his extra-terrestrial journey had been prepared.

All this may have given the impression that the religion of Islam is rigid, uncompassionate and coercive in nature. The reality, however, is quite the opposite.

I still hold firm to what I taught my students a few years ago. If the requirement for prayer is relaxed for long distance journeys on airlines, what more a journey to space! Make no mistake, I am not to be classified as a liberal, conservative, extremist, secularist and such.

The Noble Qur'an states: "Verily prayers are enjoined on Believers at fixed times" (al-Nisa', 4: 103). The key-term here is the phrase ‘fixed time' (Arabic: kitaban mauquta). Indeed, Muslims are duty bound to pray five times a day at specific durations. And Muslim scholars have done enough to calculate and determine these times respectively, whether using the traditional method of measuring the length of a shadow cast by the sun on a pole, or applying a more accurate measurement in the application of the astronomical science.

In every case, be it prayers at dawn (fajr/subh), midday (zuhr), late afternoon (‘asr), dusk (maghrib), or evening (‘isya'), these prayer times are measured and determined by the movement/motion of the earth around sun. For example, while Muslims in East Java, Indonesia, perform dawn prayers at about 4.15 a.m. (local time), Muslims in Malaysia do the same at about 5.40 a.m. Obviously, the determining factor here is not the hands of a clock but rather the movement of the earth as it rotates along its axis relative to the sun.

Many seem unaware of the fact that the question of ‘fixed time' is only relevant to our lives on earth. If we are no longer on earth, then the question of prayer times becomes no longer relevant. The question of time in relation to prayer is only relative to man on earth. In space however, since man is no longer on earth, time in relation to prayer does not apply. The revolution of the earth upon its axis relative to the sun excludes man, for which prayer is obligatory. Man in space is not traveling at the same speed as is the revolution of the earth along its axis.

Religious duties are very much associated with one's location. If one were to travel from one place to another, his/her religious obligations are performed relative to the peculiarities of his/her new destination the moment he/she reaches that place. If a Malaysian Muslim usually performs his prayers relative to the times in Malaysia, he/she must abandon this practice once he crosses the border to Thailand as the times are no longer relative to Malaysia. It is absurd to insist to pray according to the time in Kuala Lumpur while being physically in Bangkok. This Muslim has now to follow the times relative to Bangkok in carrying out his religious duties.

Therefore, it is absurd to argue that a spaceman may apply the time of his place of departure in order for him to carry out obligatory religious duties in a place not relative to earth.

Another example concerns an analogy of air travel. When one flies a long distance, he traverses different time zones. Take, for example, the Kuala Lumpur-London route, represents a more than 12 hour journey covering a distance of more than 10,000 km over a vast body of ocean and land. The flight will have to traverse through seven different time zones. If one departs KLIA at 12.50 p.m., at a speed of over 800 km/h, 15 minutes after take off, the aircraft will be over the ocean, followed by land, mountains, desert and so on.

Supposing the traveler wishes to pray zuhr. As the plane traverses different time zones every 30 minutes, which time will he need to follow? Is it the time relative to Malaysia, the ocean, India or Saudi Arabia? It may not be zuhr in India although it may be in Kuala Lumpur. Why do the Muslims of today feel the need to complicate matters when Islam is easy and simple? Even if one is heading for Mekkah to perform the pilgrimage, in this situation, the question of prayer during the journey by air seems absurd. We have already said that prayer during flight is unnecessary, what more prayer in outer space

The time factor in this realm is relative to man in space. But as we have said, time for prayer is relative to man on earth; and therefore if man is not on Earth, prayer in relation to time on earth does not apply to him.

My point is that Islam is easy, pragmatic and dynamic; it is neither rigid nor extreme. The Muslims, regardless of their social or economic status, from among the royals, political leaders, corporate figures, executives, professionals, academics, administrators, and so on who have to spend hours in long meetings or other extended commitments, surgeons who sacrifice their time to save human lives in hours of medical operations, those having difficulty in the workplace, even night market traders, the solution(s) for their preoccupation/predicament is there within Islam itself if they truly understand and not fall victim to a very narrow interpretation of religion. As far as combining the prayers, I believe many have been applying and practicing this new interpretation/method on many occasions prior to the modern era.
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comments from preferred anonymous sources

Besides than the abovementioned, please take into account :

"The positioning of the Holy Kaabah ON EARTH and not in the AIR or SPACE"

MYSTICAL ABILITIES

02 January 2008 - From silat-melayu.blogspot.com

Mystical Abilities of Silat Masters

The mystical abilities of silat masters cannot be defined in any straightforward manner.

In the old days, in Pahang and other states in Malaysia, a real Melayu silat master needs to have profound skills and competency in the self-defence techniques of his silat style and to be at his peak always, as there will bound to be someone who will try to challenge him to a duel.

It is not just to test his ability, but sometimes it is by someone who wants to be his pupil or student, and to learn new techniques to improve his own art of self-defence.

Besides having to strengthen their physical beings, silat masters sometimes need to enhance their spiritual or mystical abilities through methods they were taught.

We know from stories told by their children, close friends and students that some of these silat masters have some kind of mystical abilities and supernatural energies beyond comprehension by the laymen.

It is definitely beyond rational logic and belief, perhaps one step beyond the normal paradigm, closer to the twilight zone.

Below are some of the extraordinary capabilities and mystical abilities of silat masters covering not merely brute physical strength but also extra-physical abilities bordering on spiritual and supernatural powers, from stories told and from my own personal knowledge.

Invincibility

These are special abilities where no bullets, deadly weapons and even poisons cannot kill them. Sometimes their shirt or clothes are completely torn by gunpowder bullets and cannon fire but they are still alive and strong.

Mat Kilau, the great Pahang nationalist who fought against the British in the late 1890s, was said to be invulnerable to bullets. In fact he showed bullet scars in several places of his body during the investigation on the veracity of his identity in 1975. The bullets could not penetrate further than just below the skin.

He is also said to be able to eat a fish whole - bones and all - without being choked.

Hang Tuah, the great Melayu silat exponent during the Sultanate of Melaka, was said to be invincible when in possession of the keris Taming Sari keris.

Localised power and strength

A master may have power and extraordinary strength concentrated secretly in one part of his body, such as a finger in one hand, where he will use its killer potent during actual fights to kill. Just a touch will kill an opponent.

His students will know this when he will close the finger and not use it when teaching silat to his students or during his normal everyday activities, as it is dangerous when touched.

Brute strength

Stories have been told of Tok Gajah (father of Mat Kilau) who can lift a house. Mat Kilau himself had the super ability to lift a cow or cattle single-handedly.

And I know that my silat master (who died about twenty-five years ago), once lifted a Volkswagen Beetle and threw it when a group of disrespectful strangers messed up with him. No need to say what they then did!

Turning a common object into a deadly weapon

The silat master could use ordinary twigs or branches of trees or rattan cane to fight guns and cannons. The item used will turn deadly and if it doesn’t kill immediately, the opponent touched by the object will die sooner or later.

Mat Kilau is said to have used only a piece of sharpened cane in battles with the British who used modern gunfires.

Making weapons search and kill targets from afar
Stories of flying kerises, parang (machete) and other weapons, searching for their targets, are common. These weapons kill or injure the targeted opponent or enemy, whether individually or many.

And understandably this method is really accurate, unlike the modern cruise missiles where the innocents are also killed or maimed, crudely termed as "collateral damage". In contrast, the pre-directed weapon (keris or machete) knows what or who to target and look for.

Invisibility

This usually happens when a master is outnumbered or surrounded, and he will use the ability to turn himself invisible to escape from opponents.

Mock death

Mat Kilau has the ability to make himself looked dead, even when examined. He is in a sort of hibernation mode with no breathing and no pulse - a super-normal ability to stop his heartbeat for several hours when doing this.

Thus Mat Kilau was thought by the British to have died in an ambush by the Siamese in Kelantan in the late 1890s. And after having been examined and certified dead by both the Siamese and then the British, he was later buried.

Apparently his supporters replaced his body with a banana trunk when they pretended to bury him.

Well, he lived to 122 years old and actually died only in 1976!

Making projectiles miss their target

This ability is where bullets or weapons directed at him will miss the target. The master will just stand there and the bullets, spears, arrows or whatever, will never touch him. It is as though those bullets or objects were deflected by something.

This phenomena can sometimes be seen today during performances and demonstrations by certain styles of the Silat Melayu.

Turning into a another creature

Mystical abilities of some silat masters to change their form into a certain animal, such as a cat or bird, are for the purpose of listening to the strategies and tactics of their enemies.

This method is also used to escape from enemies, besides becoming invisible as mentioned above.

Some masters of the silat harimau style are able to change themselves into the cat family ("harimau" is Malay for "tiger") to suit their purpose.

Walking on water

His ability to walk on water is also one of the mystical abilities of a silat master.

Mat Kilau and his friend, Dato’ Bahaman, another famous Pahang nationalist fighter against the British, were known to be able to walk, skim and glide on the rivers of Pahang, not only when escaping, but when going for the attack.

Making an opponent immobile

Making their opponent or enemy unable to move is also one of the mystical abilities of silat masters and such stories are also quite common.

An opponent or enemy sometimes get stuck on his feet, or is unable to stand up when sitting down, or unable to take out his weapon, such as a pistol or sword from its sheath, as it is stuck. The opponent is then at the silat master’s mercy.

Well, I’ve just outlined just some of the unbelievable things that a great Melayu silat master can do.

Super abilities are God-given and are to be used only for good purposes. Otherwise the abilities will never happen.

The cynics will probably laugh at the supposedly mystical abilities of silat masters mentioned above. But as I mentioned somewhere before, never, ever underestimate the real silat masters.

Most Melayu probably know and learn to respect them, especially those silat masters who are humble, who hide and never show off their skills to others.

Be really afraid of such people – they are the real masters. They use their powers only when truly needed.

So next time you learn silat from a great master, in Pahang or elsewhere, observe how the master keeps his secret weapon. It could be anything.

This article was sourced from http://www.pahang-delights.com/mystical-abilities.html. I believe it's a good seed for discussion, especially since it highlights many things that modern media no longer talk about when it comes to silat. For obvious reasons, of course. So, discuss!

Posted by Mohd Nadzrin Wahab on silat-melayu.blogspot.com

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Salam

(Here's my 2 sens worth)

To many, the following views might be construed as 'sensitive matters'. Thus, as the commenter, I would like to ask the readers to treat the following as 'the thought for the day' or 'something worth thinking' of.

To the Prophets, the supernatural Powers are known as 'Mukjizat' (I think the closest translation would be 'Divine Miracles' - please correct me..) - Objective? - Clear cut - limited for 'facilitation of Dakwah Nubuwwah' in order to strenghten follower's faith in God. (of whether they accept the 'Signs' or not...or deemed such 'Divine Miracles' as 'Magic'/Sihir..that's a different story)

This was proven that once a person decides to follow (the follower) the religion of the Prophets, then it is NOT the 'Mukjizat' that the Prophets would be teaching but 'all you need to know about faith!'

The 'Mukjizat'; in this context; is clearly for 'mini-demonstration' of 'Allah's Power' and can occur only by 'His Exclusive Commands/Will' alone.

Prophet Moses a.s. would not have known how to use his 'tongkat' against the Pharaoh's magicians if not for Allah S.W.T. commanded him - "Jatuhkan tongkatmu" (drop the (your) cane)

Prophet Muhammad S.A.W. would not have come out with the various 'Miracles' if not for his prayers for Allah's Signs to take place - for example : In The Badr War - it was clearly narrated that the Prophet prayed for Allah's Help (NasrunminAllah) and Help came in from 'heavens'.

To the Sufism quarters - the stories about supernatural powers or generally known to Sufism as as 'karomah' or 'maunah'.

It was said (not me saying..ok?)that to the Sufis - 'karomah' and 'maunah' are some forms of supernatural powers manifested by Allah's willing in order to educate and convince 'some' (not all) their students/practitioners on the Greatness and Unlimited Powers of Allah S.W.T.

In another word, it is also closely related to 'Dakwah' (Propagation of Religion)

(Refer to the stories of the Nine Saints - Wali Songo)

The opposite to 'karamah' is 'istidraj' - something that looks/similar to the process of 'karamah' but can simply be 'demonstrated' without any purpose but for 'pride and ego' sake or 'to convince followers to be led 'astrayed' by anyone.

The supernatural powers; however; are defined differently to the Malay Warriors but despite these different approaches, applications, interpretation - the objective remains the same - it's still about 'strenghtening one's faith in Allah S.W.T.

Take for example - 'Invincibility' - to a real learned warrior/guru, they will ask the students/apprentices with this question (this is a typical presumption not the actual case):

"Do you believe that you will be harmed/hurt - by a sharp object; by Allah's Willing; OR by the object's natural characteristics of sharpness?"

If you say "Yes - It's by Allah's Willing", the typical reply would be :

"Then can I 'test' you by stabbing you with the sharp object?"

This is not about ridiculing the students but it's about testing one's faith in Allah S.W.T. - thus it is still related to 'Dakwah'

"If you say "No - it's about the sharpness of such object" the typical reply would be :

"You only believe in what you see (logic) but not what you have professed or claim you have professed"

Thus, like a scientist - test the theory not merely accepting the theory.
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Some cases of what appear to look like 'supernatural powers' among the Malay Warriors are surprisingly not really about supernaturality at all.

It's about wit, cunning and believing into something firmly.

Example - Invisibility - some said that this can be done by knowing how to 'manipulate' the 'blind spot' of the eye. (whatever that means)

Example 2 - Camouflaging - much like the Armed Forces using 'greens' (uniform and utilities) to 'fool' the enemy.
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Another scenario that interests me is an Illusionist - who can make or rather divert e.g. your attention on his other hand (while he hides the real object that you're supposed to see (card for e.g.) using the other hand) - "sleight of hands"

Or 'use' your ability to see and hear in order to convince you that what you're hearing or seeing is the 'actual' thing - where in reality, the sound that you're hearing comes from elsewhere (but very close to the actual object that you're looking at) or what you are really supposed to see. - e.g. Mirror tricks or tying a box of matches in the magician's long sleeve while shaking the other empty box.
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I believe I have spoken once in Nazdrin's Silat Melayu Dot Com about how the concept of Bruce Lee's martial arts skill where he 'trained' himself evolutionarily in order to get used to level of 'physical strength' (Please note that he also practiced the 'self-confidence' within as well)

Example, punching 'sand bag', once you're used to it, you will upgrade the challenge to 'punching bag full of ice-blocks' and once you're used to the latter, you go further by punching 'bag full of stones blocks'. So on and so forth. The same thing applies by the 'jumping' exercise (or first using the trampoline and next using the ground). Higher and higher you go.

I have heard people - practicing the 'one move exercise' - e.g. punching mere air - hundreds of times daily repetitively for years.

When the 'time' comes, if the opponent tried to block his punch, the opponent may break his arm due to the strength and speed of the practitioner majoring ONLY in punching.
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During my school days, my favourite best event was sprinting. (even to the MSSM - National Level)

One of my favourite practices (trained by a tomoi master) were :

a) running by the seaside on sand - where you get quickly exhausted...faster and faster I go until I get used to running on the sand.

a1) running by the seaside with small sand bags tied to both legs. This was even more exhausting than (a)

b) Later 'upgraded' myself by practicing running in the seawater (boy..it was really tough) - not only I have to run in the 'wet soaked sand' but going against/withstanding the 'water pressure' as well,

b1) The BEST part was again running in seawater, wet and soaked sand PLUS tying the sand bag on both of my legs. (So you see what I mean)

Then what happened to me on the actual track itself. I think you all know when I say to you I've won consecutive state champions in short distance but finally was beaten by this one very good sprinter.

I did asked him, how he managed to beat me : Guess what?

He also practiced exactly the same way I've practiced (ironically trained by another tomoi master) - the difference was that, he started 2 years earlier than I did...
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Now, despite of what I've said above, of course there is 'genuinity' about the manifestation of supernaturality by reciting incantations, Qur'anic Verses, Allah's Names/Atrributes etc. Just find the right Gurus, you'll find the right 'abilities'.

The one thing (coincidence?) that is undeniable is that most of these Warriors quoted herein were also known as 'very religious Muslims' and have been linked to some Sufi Masters/Orders during their time.

In conclusion,

a) supernatural powers are very real and do exist - there are still things seen but cannot be explained by any kind of logic and even science. Supernatural is NOT a legend or myth.

b) 'Practice also makes perfect'

c) 'Confidence' can make one stronger

Wallahu'alam (Allah knows Better)

p.s. Many more I can talk about this - but let's open it for open discussion.

e.g. "Why would the 'sahabat' got hurt or become martyrs in the 'Jihad' wars - when stabbled with a sword?" and

"Prophet Muhammad S.A.W. broke his teeth in the Uhud war?"

Paradox? I'll continue later..InsyaAllah
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Salams...I wish to add one more point :

Ironically, most Silat and Sufi apprentices look for masters :

a) to 'learn' the 'how to manifest 'supernaturality' or perhaps to 'become invincible' or whatsoever,

b) seeking for sufi masters to learn of how to become a 'saint' or 'wali' or at least to possess 'supernatural powers' (karamah/maunah)

Personally, I must object to this common/typical attitude/intentions - it is really not ethical or inaccurate to have such intentions.

Let's say you have to visit or invited by an elderly person to visit him,

My question to all of you :

If the elderly person appears to you NOT having 'anything mystical powers to your interest', so you would not visit him? At least as a sign of respect?

or

You visit this elderly person upon hearing 'his supernaturality'.

Don't you think this is almost equivalent to 'insincerity"?
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If you read carefully of what I've said before this post, you will understand the rationale of 'my objection'.

Wassalaam.

WHAT IS AUTENTICITY IN SILAT?

With best compliments from Mohd Nadzrin Wahab of http://silat-melayu.blogspot.com

30 December 2007

What is authenticity in Silat?

The idea of authenticity is a very important one for silat styles in Malaysia. Many discussions and heated debates have taken place in the past and still take place because of 'authenticity'. Many a perguruan have begun their public relations campaign by attesting to the 'keAslian' of their style.

Non-Melayu who arrive in Malaysia find themselves in the thick of this, often being heavily worked over by masters who try to convince them that their styles are good because they are authentic. To gain a greater insight into this, it would be beneficial to discover just why many Melayu actually think this way and why it is important to them.

Adat and Tariqah

Based on my personal research, this notion comes from two sources, Adat (as in Adat Melayu, not the religious kind) and Tariqah. The Adat of the Melayu are based upon the subservience to royalty and as such, lineage of a successor king becomes an important factor in determining who rules the land.

It is said that only royalty can install royalty. Such ideas of recognition stem from Melayu kings claiming lineage from Alexander the Great, and receiving their sovereign status from China, the most powerful country in the world (back then and maybe soon again). They HAD no United Nations Organisation, so China was as good as they got.

This idea of authentication spread throughout silat, which demanded that only duly elected representatives of the master could lead or represent the mini-government that was the perguruan. Thus, the master, often a titled Pendekar, Panglima, Hulubalang (given by a reigning Sultan, which is traditionally how Pendekars are titled anyway in Malaysia's history) would pass on such royal authority to his successors, thus creating only one line of succession.

At the same time, Islam set foot in Malaysia through various channels, but almost always through the vehicle of Tariqah (Sufi Orders) such as Rifaiah, Alawiyah, Qadiriah, etc, which places great importance upon Rabitah & Wasilah (the unbroken connection of knowledge that exists from Prophet Muhammad down through the centuries from master to master).

In the cases where these Silat masters studied religion from Sufi masters (and in turn inherited the Rabitah & Wasilah from them) to become Sheikhs themselves, these two traditions have been upheld.

So, if you bump into a Melayu who would argue you to the ground on the importance of lineage, these could probably be one of the reasons. The next question might be, what is the importance of Rabitah & Wasilah to such a Melayu? That, is a whole other article.

Cultural Accreditation

Sometimes, out of a sense of common identity unity, the Melayu will allow and accept a wider definition of Silat. So much so that someone founded a silat style without actually studying any silat.

Once again, the Silat Lian Padukan is registered as a silat style with PESAKA Johor even though it clearly has Chinese origins and Siamese accessories. Also, not many people remember that the eminent Ustaz Hamzah Haji Abu of Kalaripayat Malaysia was actually invited to join PESAKA as Silat Kalaripayat.

Both occured because the current masters were Muslims and were accepted by the Melayu community.

Ill-defined common references

When you sit down to debate a traditional Melayu silat practitioner, the word he will most often use in this context is Asli. If you look up Asli, you'll find that sometimes, what he means is not the standard dictionary definition. Unfortunately, depending on who you're talking to, Asli can mean one of three contexts in English: Traditional, Authentic or Original.

Traditional means passed down from generation to generation. This is the general meaning most imply. Traditional means nothing is changed along this channel of transmission. The methods and thought remain zealously guarded, even in the face of newer ideas. Many Melayu arts claim to be traditional.

For instance, Gayung Fatani and their claims can be easily verified via the many masters of the art who studied it in separate informal perguruan extant of one another. Yet their styles share amazing congruence in many forms, including tari, terminology and allied cultural expressions (music, dress, adat, etc).

Authentic means authenticated or given authority to propagate. This second meaning does not touch upon the veracity of the art's lineage but at one point in time, is given a seal of approval by someone in power, such as the Agong, Sultan or a powerful figure.

It is literally an endorsement of the master's skills and abilities which is passed on like a halal logo from generation to generation. In this case, the passing itself is not as important as the seal.

For instance, Buah Pukul Mersing, although originally a Yunnanese pukulan art, has found its way into the rightful (by his master, of course) hands of Pak Mat Kedidi who blended it with various silat styles and tomoi to become LianPadukan.

That it was no longer the original form is not as important as the fact that he received the Nukil (written and spiritual authentication) from Chu Aman to develop the art as he saw fit. This authority is now passed to his successor Haji Hasyim Haji Salleh who continues to upgrade the art.

Original means that the art in question did not and never has borrowed from any physical source but came about as solutions to several combat conundrums. This is, however, debateable, since it is very rare that an individual just wakes up one day and decides to create a silat style from nothing.

But, with the prevalence of masters who purport to receive their styles in dreams and inspiration with no previous martial training, there are those who rightly claim such originalness.

So, I suppose the next time someone comes up with this word Asli, you might want to ask them, exactly what do they mean?

My personal opinion? If you're a good fighter who made up your own art and it works, and you catch the eye of a Sultan somewhere and eventually have a large school for thousands of students that span several generations, you would have already laid the foundation for your art to become Asli in all senses of the word.

This article has been modified from one I originally posted on the Martial Arts Planet forums several years ago.

Posted by Mohd Nadzrin Wahab in http://silat-melayu.blogspot.com